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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in a crimi-
nal case. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(e). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is evidence that the defendant driver, without otherwise culpable conduct, struck 
and killed a bicyclist who should have been visible to her, sufficient to support the jury's 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with criminal negligence; and 
to support its rejection of what was an undisputed reasonable alternative hypothesis 
which was based upon the defendant's medical condition? (R. 153 pp. 320, 492; R. 154 
pp. 497-98.) "[W]hen reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light, is so in-
conclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to the defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction." State v. Warden, 
813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
"Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with crimi-
nal negligence, causes the death of another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206. 
"A person engages in conduct . . . [w]ith criminal negligence or is crimi-
nally negligent with respect to the circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a na-
ture and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal in a criminal case from a final Judgment, Sentence, and Convic-
tion of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, finding defendant 
guilty of the crime of negligent homicide, a Class A misdemeanor. (R. 139-41.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was charged with and convicted of one count of negligent homi-
cide in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206. She was sentenced to 365 days in jail 
and a fine of $4,625, and ordered to pay restitution of $18,105. The jail term was sus-
pended on the condition that Mrs. DeSeelhorst serve 180 days of home confinement, 
which she has completed. (R. 140.)1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 18, 2004, Mrs. DeSeelhorst was driving up Big Cottonwood Can-
yon to her home at Solitude Resort, a drive she had made hundreds of times before. 
(R. 153 pp. 342, 391-92, 397.) A few hundred yards from the first entrance to the resort, 
where the road bends to the right in a long, sweeping curve, Mrs. DeSeelhorst struck and 
killed Josie Johnson, who had been riding a bicycle on the highway in the right-hand 
lane. (R. 152 p. 216; R. 153 pp. 314, 342, 363.) 
1
 A wrongful death claim against Mrs. DeSeelhorst alleging civil liability for the death of 
Josie Johnson has been settled out of court. 
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The physical evidence showed that Ms. Johnson was riding in the right uphill 
travel lane, about 18 inches to the left of the fog line marking the boundary of the high-
way as it curves to the right, and that Ms. Johnson was struck by the middle of Mrs. De-
Seelhorst's vehicle. (R 152 pp. 187-88, 206-08, 220.) Based on that physical evidence 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst's right tires were just outside the fog line on the right shoulder of the 
highway. (Ex. P-22; R. 152 pp. 207, 224, 233; R. 153 p. 294.) Her vehicle struck Ms. 
Johnson's bicycle from the right rear at a slight oblique angle. (R. 153 pp. 284-87, 308-
09.) It then traveled in a straight line that led from the right-hand lane, partially onto the 
unpaved shoulder, and back onto the paved roadway and into the right-hand land, before 
finally coming to rest almost in the opposing downhill lane. (R. 152 pp. 214-22.) There 
was no evidence of skid marks, braking, or evasive turns or maneuvers by Mrs. DeSeel-
horst prior to or following the accident. (R. 152 pp. 184, 203, 221-23.) 
The testimony at trial was that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was traveling five to ten miles 
under the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour at the time of the accident (R. 152 
p. 191; R. 153 pp. 299-300, 230, 343, 406), and that she was a cautious driver with an 
unblemished driving record during the years prior to the accident (R. 153 pp. 342, 359, 
390, 392). The evidence also showed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was not impaired by alcohol 
or drugs (R. 152 pp. 156, 162, 172-73, 177; R. 153 pp. 255-56, 261- 62, 352), and that 
she had not been using her cell phone at the time of the accident (R. 153 pp. 274-78, 310-
11, 344-45, 407). Finally, there was no evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was tired or 
sleepy (R. 153 p. 467), or had otherwise directed her attention away from the road 
(R. 153 pp. 406-07). 
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The State disclaimed any reckless or deliberate mens rea on the part of Mrs. De-
Seelhorst (R. 152 p. 142; R. 154 pp. 501, 534), but offered no evidence or explanation at 
trial of how the accident could have occurred in the absence of an intent by Mrs. DeSeel-
horst to strike Ms. Johnson. 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was distraught and badly shaken by the accident. (R. 152 
pp. 154-56; R. 153 pp. 260, 351, 362.) She was instructed to fill out an accident report 
form at the scene by law enforcement authorities, which she completed with the help of 
her husband, who arrived shortly after the accident. (R. 152 p. 231; R. 153 pp. 355-57, 
360-67, 372-73, 402, 407-08.) That account of the accident (Ex. P-16) stated that Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst saw Ms. Johnson approximately 150 feet before the point at which the acci-
dent occurred (R. 152 pp. 175, 230), and that she was traveling at between 35 and 40 
miles per hour, (R. 152 p. 230), but was otherwise inconsistent with the physical evidence 
at the scene (R. 152 pp. 207-08). 
At trial, Mrs. DeSeelhorst testified that she had no actual memory of the accident 
(R. 153 p. 397), and that she had attempted in the report to reconstruct how the accident 
must have occurred because she thought she was obligated to complete the report form 
(R. 153 pp. 406-08, 430). She testified that although she recalled driving up the canyon 
and seeing something moving in the distance, she did not recall seeing Ms. Johnson be-
fore the accident. She recalled the impact of the cyclist on her windshield, (R. 153 
pp. 397-98), but she could not recall bringing her vehicle to a stop. She also recalled call-
ing her husband at Solitude in order to obtain medical assistance, and moving her vehicle 
to the side of the road. (R. 153 pp. 398-400, 416-18.) 
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Mrs. DeSeelhorst was 66 years old at the time of the accident. She has a mechani-
cal mitral valve which was implanted in her heart some time before 1991, and which re-
quires that she take a prescription blood thinner to reduce the risk of blood clots around 
the valve. (R. 152 pp. 228-29; R. 153 pp. 358, 419.) Notwithstanding this precaution, 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst suffered a major stroke in 1991 (R. 153 pp. 392, 443-46), and another 
stroke-like incident and seizure in 1994 which doctors later determined was linked to the 
1991 stroke (R. 153 pp. 393, 446). She lost some balance, some physical strength, and 
some short term memory as the result of the 1991 stroke (R. 153 pp. 418, 426-27, 449-
51), and takes additional prescription medication to control seizures brought on by the 
1991 stroke (R. 152 pp. 172, 228-29; R. 153 pp. 358, 392-93). An MRI of Mrs. DeSeel-
horst's brain performed 14 months after the accident showed evidence of regular "tran-
sient ischemic attacks"-minor seizures or "mini strokes." (R. 153 pp. 455-64). Despite 
these medical problems, it was undisputed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst had never been advised 
that as a result of her medical condition she should not operate a motor vehicle. 
Dr. John Foley, Chief of Neurology at LDS Hospital, testified that in his expert 
opinion, Mrs. DeSeelhorst had a neurological "event" during which she suffered a brief 
but critical loss of consciousness of 15 to 30 seconds beginning shortly before the acci-
dent. He believed the neurological event was caused by small blood clots breaking off 
from her mitral valve implant. (R. 153 pp. 442-43, 460-61, 469-70, 477-78, 482-83). Dr. 
Foley based his testimony on the following facts: (i) Mrs. DeSeelhorst had a heightened 
2
 After the accident, Mrs. DeSeelhorst voluntarily surrendered her driver's license. 
(R. 155 p. 8.) 
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risk of blood clots because of her mitral valve implant, (R. 153, pp. 479-80); (ii) the MRI 
and other medical evidence showed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst had suffered seizures and 
mini-strokes causing brief losses of consciousness following her major stroke in 1991 
(R. 153 pp. 468-69, 478, 486); (iii) the physical evidence showed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
did not brake before impact, and that her vehicle traveled in a straight line both before, 
during, and after impact (R. 153 pp. 469-70, 482, 486); and (iv) Mrs. DeSeelhorst testi-
fied that she could not recall the events immediately prior to and during the accident 
(R. 153 pp. 467-82, 486). The State introduced no evidence to rebut either Dr. Foley's 
expert testimony regarding Mrs. DeSeelhorst's medical condition or the medical explana-
tion it provided for the accident. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The mens rea required for the crime of negligent homicide is criminal negligence. 
Criminal negligence requires a "gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4). 
In State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252, the defendant made a left 
turn in front of an oncoming vehicle which was readily visible and which he should have 
seen. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction for negligent homicide, holding that 
additional evidence was required in order to satisfy the requirement of criminal negli-
gence. Finding no evidence that the defendant was impaired or distracted, or had been 
driving recklessly or erratically prior to the accident, the Court stated, "defendant's con-
duct, while apparently negligent, does not rise to the level of criminal negligence. De-
fendant's conduct is more accurately characterized as a serious mistake in judgment." 
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2000 UT App 106 121, 999 P.2d at 1257. That result is consistent with a long line of 
Utah cases. 
The case at bar is similar to Larsen. There was no evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
was distracted, drowsy, inattentive, or reckless. Rather, the evidence was that she simply 
drove her car directly into a cyclist whom she should have seen. While such an act may 
be negligent, it does not form the basis for criminal responsibility. 
The State attempted to satisfy its burden of proving criminal negligence by argu-
ing that Mrs. DeSeelhorst had "cut the corner" of the curve. That argument was based on 
the physical evidence at the scene the right wheels of her car were inside the fog line at 
the point of impact. That physical evidence, without the additional proof required by 
Larsen, does not denote criminal responsibility for several reasons. First, it is consistent 
with merely inattentive driving. Second, it is not causally related to the accident because 
the bicyclist was in the roadway, not on the shoulder. Finally, the suggestion that she 
was "cutting the corner" is mere speculation on the part of the State in light of the medi-
cal evidence offered at trial. The State's hypothesis, that Mrs. DeSeelhorst simply drove 
into the cyclist for no apparent reason, is "inherently improbable," and thus cannot form 
the basis for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal responsibility. State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1991). 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst offered a reasonable alternative hypothesis to the State's version 
of events, which was unrebutted at trial. The evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst suffered a 
medical event that rendered her temporarily unable to respond to external stimuli, fully 
explains the physical evidence and answers the otherwise unanswered question why she 
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would have driven directly into the back of what by all accounts was a visible human be-
ing. The State did not offer any answer at all to that question, leaving the medical hy-
pothesis unrebutted. The State's failure to provide an evidentiary basis for the jury to 
conclude that criminal negligence is the only reasonable explanation of the evidence indi-
cates reasonable doubt as a matter of law and thus requires reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT MRS. DESEELHORST 
ACTED WITH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. 
The standard of review for a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a 
jury verdict in a criminal case is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he or she was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1991) 
(brackets omitted). The reviewing court must review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. 
"Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with crimi-
nal negligence, causes the death of another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206. Criminal 
negligence is defined as follows: 
"A person engages in conduct . . . [w]ith criminal negligence or is crimi-
nally negligent with respect to the circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a na-
ture and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4). 
Utah follows the majority rule that proof of criminal negligence requires signifi-
cantly more than proof of mere negligence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4) (crimi-
nal negligence requires proof that defendant's conduct was a "gross deviation" from the 
ordinary standard of care); accord MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) at 226 (1985) 
(same); State v. Sandiford, 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) ("ordinary negligence, which 
is the basis for a civil action in damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negli-
gence"); State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Utah 1991) ("criminal negligence differs 
substantially from ordinary civil negligence"). 
The theory of criminally negligent homicide that the State argued at trial is that 
despite being familiar with the road and aware that bicyclists frequently use it, and de-
spite actually seeing Ms. Johnson in the right-hand lane immediately before the accident 
occurred, Mrs. DeSeelhorst drove partially out of her lane onto the shoulder, and neither 
braked nor took other evasive action as she approached Ms. Johnson, thereby creating a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that she would hit Ms. Johnson and cause the cyclist's 
death. In support of the jury's verdict of criminally negligent homicide, the evidence at 
trial was that: 
3
 In its opening statement, the prosecution asserted: 
[Mrs. DeSeelhorst is] off the road. She says she sees Josie Johnson at 150 
feet and, yet, she still hits her. And it's right in the middle of her vehicle. 
There are no skid marks before it, there are not brake marks after it; she ba-
sically plowed right through her, cutting the comer on the curve. (R. 152 
p. 142.) 
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(1) Mrs. DeSeelhorst frequently drove on the road on which the accident oc-
curred, and knew that bicyclists frequently use this road in good weather. 
(R. 152 p. 216; R. 153 pp. 342, 391-92, 397, 443.) 
(2) The accident report that Mrs. DeSeelhorst completed at the scene stated that 
she saw Ms. Johnson riding her bicycle on the right-hand side of the road 
when Mrs. DeSeelhorst was about 150 feet away. (Ex. P-16; R. 152 
pp. 175, 230.) Based on that report, Michael Leary, an investigator for the 
District Attorney's office, testified that if Mrs. DeSeelhorst had been driv-
ing at 30 to 40 miles per hour, she would have had between 2.6 and 3.4 sec-
onds to avoid Ms. Johnson, and that a person in the 85th percentile would 
have been able to react to the presence of Ms. Johnson in 2.1 seconds, or 
0.5 to 1.3 seconds before the accident occurred. (R. 153 pp. 301-03.) At 
trial Mrs. DeSeelhorst repudiated the statement in the accident report that 
she saw Ms. Johnson from 150 feet away, testifying that she did not see 
Ms. Johnson prior to actually hitting her (R. 153 pp. 397-98), although 
there was testimony at trial that she "saw motion behind the trees" before 
the accident (R. 153 p. 467). 
Similarly, in its closing, the prosecution argued: 
We are alleging that [Mrs. DeSeelhorst] - for how much she drives the 
canyon, for how much she sees bikers, when she saw that biker, that was a 
risk that she was aware of, or should have been aware of, and because she 
failed to avoid that risk, that's a gross deviation from the conduct that we 
expect out of people on the road. We expect people to stay in their lane, to 
not go through the gravel and hit people. (R. 154 p. 534.) 
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(3) Mrs. DeSeelhorst drifted partially out of her lane as the road curved to the 
right. (R. 152 pp. 214-22.) The right tires of her vehicle were just inside 
the fog line on the right shoulder when she struck Ms. Johnson (R. 152 
pp. 207, 224, 231-33; R. 153 p. 294), and the impact occurred in the center 
of Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle (R. 152 pp. 187-88, 206-08, 220). 
(4) There was no evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst attempted to brake or turn her 
vehicle prior to striking Ms. Johnson.4 (R. 152 pp. 184, 203, 221-23.) 
(5) The trajectory of Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle was in a straight line from the 
roadway to the point of impact, continuing on to the edge of the gravel 
4
 The State made inconsistent arguments at trial with respect to whether Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
braked her car or not. The State's theory of criminally negligent homicide included Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst's apparent failure to brake before striking Ms. Johnson. (R. 152 p. 146; 
R. 154 pp. 506, 534.) At the same time, in challenging Dr. Foley's testimony that Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst was probably unconscious at the time of the accident, the State raised the 
possibility that Mrs. DeSeelhorst had braked her car—and thus was conscious at the time 
of the accident—but no skid marks were found at the scene because Mrs. DeSeelhorst's 
vehicle had anti-lock brakes. The State never introduced evidence on the existence or 
nonexistence of anti-lock brakes, however, even thought one of the State's witnesses pos-
sessed the VIN (vehicle identification number) for Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle and could 
easily have ascertained whether or not it had anti-lock brakes. (R. 153 pp. 306-07, 483-
84.) 
The State cannot have it both ways. It cannot argue that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's fail-
ure to brake was evidence of her criminal negligence, while simultaneously arguing that 
she did brake and anti-lock brakes prevented any skid marks, particularly when the State 
could easily have confirmed the existence of anti-lock brakes and chose not to do so. 
Since the State twice argued to the jury that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's failure to brake was evi-
dence of her criminal negligence, see R. 152 pp. 142, 506, 534, it is precluded from chal-
lenging Dr. Foley's testimony by arguing that Mrs. DeSeelhorst might have braked after 
all. 
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shoulder of the road, and back onto the pavement nearly into the oncoming 
lane. (R. 152 pp. 213-14, 217-22, 284-87.) 
Evidence that defendant's conduct was "merely careless" is not sufficient to prove 
criminal negligence. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 85 (1999); see, e.g., State v. Boss, 2005 
UT App 520 f 12, 127 P.2d 1236, 1238 ("'[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment re-
sulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so'" 
(quoting State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 f 18, 999 P.2d 1252, 1257)). Criminally neg-
ligent homicide entails "such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinar-
ily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a 
proper regard for human life or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indiffer-
ence to consequences." 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 85 p. 549 (1999). For example, in 
applying a statutory definition of criminal negligence identical to Utah's, the New York 
Court of Appeals held in People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692, 555 N.E.2d 253 (1990), that 
"unless a defendant has engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing 
to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, he has not committed the crime of crimi-
nally negligent homicide." 75 N.Y.2d at 696, 555 N.E.2d at 255. 
In this case, the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the accident was the 
result of criminal negligence. Instead, the State invited the jury to infer criminal negli-
gence from the fact that an accident happened under circumstances that cannot be ex-
plained. The record in this case devoid of any evidence of blameworthy conduct by Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst at the time of the accident. There is no evidence that she was speeding at the 
time of the accident, that she was impaired by alcohol or drugs, that she was talking on 
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her cell phone or was otherwise distracted from the task of driving, or, indeed, that she 
was doing anything wrong immediately prior to the accident itself; indeed, the evidence 
is overwhelmingly to the contrary. Even if Dr. Foley's testimony and the medical evi-
dence is disregarded, the remaining evidence shows only that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was inat-
tentive for two or three seconds after seeing Ms. Johnson ahead of her in the right-hand 
lane, causing her to drift partially out of her lane while rounding a long, sweeping curve, 
and preventing her from reacting in time to brake or swerve to miss Ms. Johnson. This 
may have been negligent, but it was not criminal.5 
The requirement that the State prove serious blameworthy conduct by the defen-
dant in criminal negligence cases is evident in recent Utah vehicular homicide decisions. 
For example, this Court recently upheld a conviction for criminally negligent homicide 
where the evidence showed that in attempting to execute a pass on a two-lane highway, 
5
 Although the state is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in its favor 
based upon the evidence in the record, it is not entitled to an inference that Mrs. DeSeel-
horst deliberately or recklessly struck Ms. Johnson with her vehicle, for at least two rea-
sons. First, such an inference is inconsistent with the State's decision to charge Mrs. De-
Seelhorst with criminally negligent homicide, rather than murder or manslaughter. Sec-
ond, the State repeatedly and emphatically denied to the jury that it was seeking to prove 
the mens rea of negligent homicide by reference to intentional or reckless conduct by 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst. (R. 154 p. 501 ("Today we're not calling the defendant here a mur-
derer. Today we're calling her someone who made a grave error in judgment that day. 
That is what she did wrong")); (R. 154 p. 534 ("It's not that [Mrs. DeSeelhorst] inten-
tionally ran over Josie Johnson. That's a completely different crime, and we're not alleg-
ing that whatsoever. We're not alleging that she was even reckless with the vehicle and 
— which is manslaughter") (closing statement)); see also (R. 152 pp. 199-200 (testimony 
of medical examiner on direct examination by State that he classified Ms. Johnson's 
death as "accidental" rather than as a "homicide," based on his nonlegal judgment that 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst had not used her car "as a weapon" or otherwise acted with intent to 
kill)). 
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the driver (i) was exceeding the speed limit, (ii) attempted to execute the pass despite 
visible oncoming traffic, (iii) passed two cars at once, and (iv) jerked the steering wheel 
so hard when returning to her lane that she overturned her car into the oncoming traffic. 
State v. Boss, 2005 UT App 520 f 2-6, 127 P.3d at 1237-38. This Court reasoned that 
defendant's "excessive speed," "aggressive steering when she attempted to return her car 
to the right side of the road after passing," and "attempt to pass two cars on a two-lane 
highway in the face of coming traffic," constituted repeated and substantial deviations 
from the ordinary standard of care. Id., ffl 15-17, 127 P.3d at 1239-40. 
On the other hand, this Court has held that the State did not prove criminal negli-
gence, where the only evidence of the driver's purportedly gross deviation from the ordi-
nary standard of care was the fact of the accident itself. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 2000 
UT App 106 ff 19-21, 999 P.2d 1252, 1257 (holding that driver who caused an accident 
by making a left turn at normal speed directly into the path of a visible oncoming car, and 
who did not brake or swerve before the accident, held not criminally negligent because 
there was no evidence of other wrongful acts by driver that contributed to the accident). 
Decisions of courts in other states that require proof of substantial deviations from the or-
dinary standard of care for criminal negligence have reached similar results. See, e.g., 
State v. Garrett, 525 So.2d 1235 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (driver who struck and killed pedes-
trian walking on shoulder of road held not criminally negligent, where only evidence of 
criminal negligence was that driver had inadvertently driven on shoulder, and driver was 
not intoxicated or driving erratically); Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d at 697, 555 N.E.2d at 255 
(driver who rear-ended a parked police cruiser with flashing lights held not criminally 
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negligent, because he was not "engaged in any criminally culpable, risk-creating con-
duct," such as "dangerous speeding, racing, failure to obey traffic signals, or any other 
misconduct . . . ."); City of Parma v. Flaugh, No. 75418, 1999 WL 1068077 at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1999) (driver who saw an oncoming car and nevertheless made a left turn di-
rectly into its path held not criminally negligent, because "there is no allegation of reck-
lessness, no suggestion of driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and no 
concrete evidence of the appellant's speed").6 
6
 Utah vehicular homicide decisions under earlier statutes and at common law reflect this 
same patter, upholding convictions when there is evidence of the driver's wrongdoing or 
other blameworthy conduct, and reversing such convictions where the only evidence of 
the driver's "gross deviation" from the ordinary standard of care is the accident itself. 
Compare State v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 93, 404 P.2d 677, 679 (1965) (upholding convic-
tion for criminally negligent vehicular homicide where defendant struck and killed pedes-
trian in a marked crosswalk while traveling 20 to 30 miles per hour over the speed limit 
in an area with which he was familiar and where he knew that pedestrians would be 
crossing the streets) and State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 381-82, 160 P.2d 427, 429 (1945) 
(McDonough, J., concurring); id. at 383, 160 P.2d at 430 Wolfe, J., concurring in part); 
id. at 383, 160 P.2d at 430 (Wade, J., agreeing with Wolfe, J., on this point) (majority of 
Justices upheld conviction where driver fell asleep and vehicle struck and killed pedes-
trian on sidewalk, on ground that evidence showed defendant became sleepy almost im-
mediately after entering her vehicle long before to the accident, but continued to drive 
anyway) with State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429, 429-31 (1942) (reversing 
driver's involuntary manslaughter conviction for striking and killing a bicyclist while 
making a left turn, where defendant was traveling at or under the speed limit, turned on a 
green light, and was unable to see the child because the bicycle was not lighted, and ob-
serving that criminal negligence could not be presumed from the mere fact that a death 
resulted from the accident) and State v. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 P.2d 943, 943, 944 
(1940) (reversing conviction of driver who rear-ended disabled vehicle and killed boy 
who was pushing it, where evidence showed driver was going five to ten miles per hour 
under the speed limit and had not been drinking, his brakes and wipers were in good con-
dition, "there was nothing out of the ordinary about his driving," and he attempted to 
avoid hitting the boy once he saw him). 
The only prior decision that is not fully consistent with this pattern is State v. Rid-
dle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948), where the court upheld the conviction based on 
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Indeed, Mrs. DeSeelhorst's conduct is even less blameworthy than that of the 
driver in Larsen, where this Court found insufficient evidence of a gross deviation from 
the ordinary standard of care to support a conviction based on criminal negligence. 2000 
UT App 106 <H 19-21, 999 P.2d at 1257. In Larsen, the evidence showed that the driver 
did not have his lights on even though it was dusk, failed to use his left-turn signal, was 
not paying attention, did not see the oncoming car until it hit him, failed to brake or 
swerve before the accident, and had a small amount of alcohol in his bloodstream. Id., 
<H 6-7, 16, 19, 999 P.2d at 1254, 1256, 1257. This Court reasoned that the State proved 
no causal connection linking certain of the driver's actions and omissions to the collision 
itself, and that his remaining actions and omissions simply did not amount to a gross de-
parture from the ordinary standard of care: 
Because there is no nexus between the collision and the presence of alco-
hol, the absence of headlights, or the inactivated turn signal, these facts do 
not support the trial court's determination that defendant was criminally 
negligent. 
evidence that the driver was on the wrong side of the highway and the collision occurred 
after dark in the middle of a sharp curve. 112 Utah at 357, 363-64, 188 P.2d at 449-50, 
452-53. Even in Riddle, however, the Court declined to hold that driving on the wrong 
side of the road, without more, constituted criminal negligence: 
Whether or not it is criminal negligence to drive an automobile in such a 
manner that all or part of it extends over the center line of a highway must 
necessarily depend upon all of the surrounding circumstances. We do not 
say that in every case it is criminal negligence for a driver to permit part of 
his vehicle to project over the center line and onto the left hand side of the 
highway. Under some circumstances, such conduct might not amount to 
criminal negligence. 
112 Utah at 364, 188 P.2d at 453 (emphasis added). 
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In this case, defendant's conduct, while apparently negligent, does 
not rise to the level of criminal negligence. Defendant's conduct is more 
accurately characterized as a serious mistake in judgment. The facts pre-
sented at trial do not indicate that defendant's actions were undertaken 
recklessly or with an indifference to human life, nor does the quality of de-
fendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions were criminal. Rather, 
defendant simply failed to see an oncoming car which was visible to other 
drivers as he made a left turn, with tragic consequences. 
Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 <H 20-21, 999 P.2d at 1257. 
The State attempted to show gross negligence at trial from the fact that the right 
wheels of Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle were right of the fog line at the point of impact. 
From this evidence, the State speculated that she had "cut the corner" of the curve, even 
though her trajectory pre- and post-impact was in a straight line. But whether or not Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst "cut the corner" is irrelevant, because the accident occurred in the roadway, 
not on the shoulder. In other words, because Ms. Johnson was riding her bicycle on the 
roadway, 18 inches to the left of the fog line within the right-hand lane, Mrs. DeSeel-
horst's alleged cutting of the corner did not cause the accident, which would have oc-
curred in any event. 
Larsen squarely held that evidence of negligent acts or omissions that did not con-
tribute to an accident cannot be used to support a conviction for criminally negligent 
homicide. 2000 UT App 106 \ 20, 999 P.2d at 1257. Thus, the evidence that Mrs. De-
Seelhorst's vehicle was at or on the gravel shoulder at the time of the accident, like the 
evidence of negligence in Larsen, is irrelevant to the question of causation. Although the 
State successfully persuaded the jury that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was grossly negligent be-
cause she did not keep her car in the roadway (R. 154 p. 534), that was actually an im-
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proper consideration in the causation analysis and does not support a conclusion of gross 
negligence. 
Moreover, even if driving near or partially on the shoulder did cause the accident, 
both Larsen and Boss make clear that this is insufficient by itself to support a conviction 
of criminal negligence. Compare Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 f 21, 999 P.2d at 1257 ("the 
quality of defendant's act [does not] lead to the conclusion that his actions were crimi-
nal"). Rather, like the evidence in Larsen, the evidence here merely shows that for a few 
seconds Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to operate her car so as to avoid an accident, but did not 
otherwise engage in blameworthy conduct. Compare id. ("defendant simply failed to see 
an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he made a left turn, with tragic 
consequences"). This was not criminal negligence. 
II. DR. FOLEY'S UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY THAT THE ACCI-
DENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH A BRIEF LOSS OF CON-
SCIOUSNESS BY MRS. DESEELHORST SHORTLY BEFORE 
THE ACCIDENT BEST EXPLAINS THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
AND CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HY-
POTHESIS WHICH CREATES REASONABLE DOUBT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The physical evidence at the scene of the accident shows that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's 
vehicle proceeded in a perfectly straight line both before and after its collision with Ms. 
Johnson. This presents a puzzling question that the State cannot answer: How could Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst's car have proceeded in a straight line both before and after colliding with 
Ms. Johnson if, as the State repeatedly and emphatically argued to the jury, Mrs. DeSeel-
horst did not intend to hit Ms. Johnson? If Mrs. DeSeelhorst had simply lost control of 
her vehicle, one would have expected to find evidence of braking and swerving prior to 
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the accident, consistent with an effort to bring the vehicle back under control. Similarly, 
had Mrs. DeSeelhorst been distracted prior to the accident, one would have expected to 
find evidence of braking and swerving at least after the vehicle struck Ms. Johnson, con-
sistent with a refocused attention on driving after the unexpected collision. Of course, no 
such evidence exists, and the record is devoid of any attempt by the State to explain how 
unintentional conduct by Mrs. DeSeelhorst could be consistent with the straight-line 
course of the vehicle both before, during, and after the accident. 
Dr. John Foley, Chief of Neurology at LDS Hospital, testified that in his expert 
opinion, the physical and other evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Mrs. De-
Seelhorst was unconsciousness or only partially conscious for a period of 15 to 30 sec-
onds during the accident, as the result of either a recurrent small stroke (a "ministroke") 
or a partial complex seizure. (R. 153 pp. 442-43, 469-70, 477-78, 482-83.) Specifically, 
Dr. Foley testified that in his opinion, "there was an event which occurred which tran-
siently rendered [Mrs. DeSeelhorst] without ability to process . . . all the other kinds of 
signals coming at her, as a driver." (R. 153 p. 477.) Dr. Foley testified also that he was 
unable to imagine any other explanation for the manner in which the accident occurred. 
(R. 153 p. 482.) 
Dr. Foley based his conclusions on four factors: 
(i) The heightened risk of blood clots to which Mrs. DeSeelhorst is subject be-
cause of her mitral valve implant (R. 153 pp. 479-80); 
(ii) The MRI report and other evidence in Mrs. DeSeelhorst's medical records 
showing that she had suffered small, complex seizures and mini-strokes 
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causing brief loss of consciousness following her major stroke in 1991 
(R. 153, pp. 468-69, 478, 486); 
(iii) The physical evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst did not brake before impact, 
and that her vehicle traveled in a straight line both before, during, and after 
impact (R. 153 pp. 469-70, 482, 486); and 
(iv) Mrs. DeSeelhorst's testimony that she could not recall the events immedi-
ately prior to and during the accident (R. 153 pp. 467-82, 486). 
On cross-examination, Dr. Foley stated: 
(i) In forming his opinion, he had to rely on the MRI report filed after Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst's 1991 stroke, rather than the MRI actually taken at that time, 
because the MRI had been destroyed (R. 153 p. 472); 
(ii) He could not "precisely date" the mini-strokes and seizures as having oc-
curred prior to or on the date of the accident (R. 153 pp. 472-75, 486); 
(iii) His opinion was based in part on Mrs. DeSeelhorst's account of the acci-
dent given in her testimony at trial, which he knew differed from the ac-
count she gave in the report she completed in the hours following he acci-
dent (R. 153 pp. 478-81); 
(iv) People who have suffered a partial seizure are often confused in the imme-
diate aftermath of the seizure (R. 153 pp. 481); and 
(v) He is not a specialist in accident reconstruction (R. 153 pp. 484-85). 
The State urged the jury to disregard Dr. Foley's unrebutted expert opinion that 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was unconscious or partially conscious during the accident, because: 
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(i) The radiologist who prepared the 1991 report might not have seen MRI 
evidence of partial seizures and ministrokes prior to 1991 (R. 154, p. 505); 
(ii) Dr. Foley relied on Mrs. DeSeelhorst's trial testimony, which was inconsis-
tent with her report of the accident at the scene (R. 154 pp. 506, 507-09); 
(hi) Dr. Foley had no credibility as an accident reconstruction expert (R. 154, 
p. 507); and 
(iv) The evidence showed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was not confused in the after-
math of the accident (R. 154 pp. 509-11). 
The State's suggestion that the radiologist who prepared the 1991 MRI report 
failed to notice prior evidence of ministrokes was bald speculation. Moreover, the fact 
that Dr. Foley is not an accident reconstruction expert did not preclude him from apply-
ing his expert medical testimony to the obvious, common sense facts of the accident es-
tablished by the physical evidence. See State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987) 
(holding that a lay witness may properly "give an opinion when it is rationally based on 
the witness's perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony or the de-
termination of a fact in issue"); State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 f 19, 95 P.3d 
1193, 1198 ("'[c]ertainly it is possible for the same witness to provide both lay and expert 
testimony in the same case'" (quoting advisory committee notes to 2000 amendment to 
FED. R. EVID. 701, emphasis omitted)). 
Accordingly, even granting the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence, 
the only factor that might have negatively affected the weight the jury gave to Dr. Foley's 
testimony is his partial reliance on Mrs. DeSeelhorst's trial testimony. But even without 
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Mrs. DeSeelhorst's testimony, Dr. Foley's opinion that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was probably 
unconscious or partially conscious during the accident remains the only account offered 
by either party that plausibly explains the physical evidence. It is undisputed that Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst's vehicle followed a straight and undeviating line as it traveled from the 
right-hand lane, struck Ms. Johnson, moved partially onto the unpaved shoulder, and re-
turned to the highway. Dr. Foley's testimony explains that, because Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
was unable to steer her car during this episode, the car simply continued moving in the 
direction it was headed before she lost consciousness: it drifted partially out of the right-
hand lane and partly onto the shoulder, hit Ms. Johnson, continued further onto the 
shoulder before returning into the right-hand lane as the road curved in front of it, and 
continued through that lane to the passing lane before coming to a stop, all along the 
same straight line. Not only did the State offer no explanation for this direct and unwav-
ering vehicle path, no explanation exists that is consistent with the State's repeated and 
emphatic disavowals of intentional or reckless conduct by Mrs. DeSeelhorst. Dr. Foley 
testified to the obvious when he stated that no non-medical explanation for the accident 
can be imagined. 
It has been held in Utah that, when the State offers a persuasive explanation of 
guilt supported by the evidence, and the defendant offers an alternative explanation that is 
consistent with innocence and also supported by the evidence, the jury is entitled to 
weigh the competing explanations and choose the one it finds more persuasive. See, e.g., 
State v Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 257, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970) (observing that if the jury 
is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows 
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that they regarded the evidence as excluding every other reasonable hypothesis"). So 
long as there is sufficient evidence supporting the State's explanation to eliminate rea-
sonable doubt, it is not necessary for the State to disprove that the defendant's alternative 
explanation. Id., 470 P.2d at 247; see State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-95 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (reading Schad has having held that "despite the existence of theoretically 
'reasonable' hypotheses, it is within the province of the jury to judge the credibility of the 
testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject these alternative hypotheses"). 
Here, however, the State has offered no explanation whatsoever of the physical 
evidence, let alone a persuasive one. The State's theory of the case required to jury to be-
lieve that Mrs. DeSeelhorst consciously drove her vehicle in a straight line aimed directly 
at Ms. Johnson, but that Mrs. DeSeelhorst neither intended to hit Ms. Johnson, nor was 
reckless in the operation of her vehicle. This explanation is an "inherently improbable" 
one that no reasonable person could accept as an explanation of the accident. State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 343 (Utah 1991). 
The State must do more than merely prove that the evidence is consistent with 
criminal negligence by Mrs. DeSeelhorst. Because it carries the burden of proving its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must prove that criminal negligence by Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst is the only reasonable explanation of the evidence. Here, the State cannot 
show how this accident is even consistent with criminal negligence, let alone how such 
negligence can be the most reasonable explanation. By contrast, Mrs. DeSeelhorst pro-
vided a reasonable explanation of how the accident is consistent with her innocence. Un-
der these circumstances, there is necessarily reasonable doubt about whether Mrs. De-
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Seelhorst acted with criminal negligence, and thus insufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
was guilty of criminal negligence in colliding with Ms. Johnson. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant requests that this court reverse the conviction 
in this case. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l 1), no addendum is required. 
DATED this _J__ day of September, 2006. 
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